Abstract
Introduction

The problem and the proposed solution
In a distributed system like a cluster grid, it is very difficult to define a transparent system approach to resource management for Grid users; this is due to Grid heterogeneous architectural characteristics. In fact, one of the most important limits of a Grid regards the absolute absence of transparency for the users during job scheduling.
To resolve this problem, in this paper "Potential Games" paradigm is proposed for managing Grid resources. Moreover this proposed solution, should supplies an automated synchronization of computational reservation in order to manage concurrent access to shared resources.
Related studies
Prior art related to this research is reported in [1] , [2] and [3] . In [1] , it is considered the scheduling of n independent jobs on m non-identical machines. The main contributions in this paper include generating schedules in a concrete scheduled space using ideas taken from game theory and multi-agent.
In [2] , three different methods are compared: Optimal, Nash, and Greedy. The results show that price of anarchy focuses on the worst-case equilibrium solution. We could consider the best Nash solution, the closest to the social optimum, whereas greedy algorithm approach is a myopic strategy, because each client makes the best choice available at the moment.
In [3] , "Nash Equilibrium" solution paradigm is used to manage Grid resources as in a Microeconomic model, where users make decisions to allocate limited resources, typically as in a Grid where goods or services should be negotiated.
But, Game Theory Nash Equilibrium solution for the Prisoner's Dilemma Problem could become computationally complex, requiring an exponential amount of time, to schedule a job.
In order to solve this inefficiency problem, Hart and Mas-Colell have proposed in [10] a characterization of Shapley value (Symmetric Games) through the Potential Function idea. They have been demonstrated that we can found a function P=P(N,v), defined for every game G for every set of player and for which P(0)=0 (normalization condition).
The P Function has been named Potential Function because it is a discrete "derivata" version referred to number of players of the Game.
The Shapley value for every game associates a vector with n coordinates, obtaining for each game a scalar P, using a single number instead of a vector (exactly as classic Gravitation Theory where Gravitation Potential function for every point associates a scalar ie a number).
Moreover for this kind of games, we have verified that all Nash equilibrium solutions correspond to the Potential Function minimum.
Strategic Game Form and Nash Equilibrium
In [4] In a game G, you need to know the players' preferences for the different elements of E. A fast and simple mode to describe these preferences is to use "utility functions" u(x) [5, 6] . For example, for player I assume it is given a function u defined in E and with values in ℝ, interpreting u(e')≥ u(e'') as an expression of: player I prefers outcome e' to outcome e'' [4, 5, 6] .
So, having a game form (X,Y,E,h) and two utility functions (for both players) (w,v), this is the expression form of the game: (X,Y,E,h,w,v)
Defining f=w∘h and g=v∘v, we will obtain (X,Y,f,g) or a strategic form game for two players, as defined in [4] .
Where:
• X,Y are sets
Prisoner's Dilemma and Potential Games
The Potential Function
In the game theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma is a type of game where the only concern of each individual player ("the prisoner") is to maximize his own payoff, without any concern for the other player's payoff [4] .
In this type of game the preference relation effect ≥ i is that players have an obvious strategy to apply, and this is consequent to the presence of dominant strategies. The other effect of payoff is that the result of strategic interaction is non-efficient for this game [4, 5, 6] . Considering a game G=(X,Y,f,g) with two players, it will be a Potential Game if exists a function:
Where (x, y) ∈ XxY, ∀ x∈ X and ∀ y∈ Y :
The function P is named Potential Function [4, 10] .
The 
where: d>c>b>a.
Model of agent payoff: u(x)
Apply this model to a specific example and suppose having m players' equivalent to m jobs that must be scheduled on t WN:
• Possible moves are equivalent to all possible job allocations j 1 In other words, every Prisoner Agent will do conjectures about other agents' strategies and make the best choice (with the highest profit value) for him, ensure that every other agent does not have other strategies with the highest profit u(x), move on all matrixes and follow Nash Equilibrium solutions for Prisoner's Dilemma problem.
An example of Potential Game application to the Prisoner's Dilemma problem
For example, given 3 jobs and 2 WN we have the Prisoner's Dilemma Game Matrix M' as:
M' 1 :
WN 2 (d-c , d-c, d-c) ((d-c)+(b-a) , (dc)+(b-a), (d-c)+(ba))
M' 2 :
c, c) (a-(d-c), c, a-(d-c))
WN 2 (c, a-(d-c), c) (a-(d-c), a-(d-c), a-(d-c))
Where
M' i is the i-th input Game Matrix and a,b,c,d are parameters measured for the job i'-th (where i' = 1, …, m) on WN i''-th (where i'' = 1, …, t) as a payoff for the players j 1 ,…,j m .
On the above Game Matrix, Nash Equilibrium will be calculated as follows: fixed payoff for agents' j 1 and j 3 then the second agent j 2 moves itself on the rows to verify if a better strategy exists, vice versa fixed payoff for agents' j 2 and j 3 then the first agent j 1 moves itself on the columns, finally fixed j 1 and j 2 , j 3 choose best parameter between M' 1 and M' 2 [5] .
Cluster Grid used for experiments
The main STMicroelectronics Grid service goal consists in simulating EDA (Electronics Design Automation) batch jobs and analyzing events produced by these simulations.
The simulation scenario used for experiments consists in a Grid cluster model with local data on a disk storage shared via NFS.
Cluster used for the experimentation tests can be summarized as follows:
• Class Type SUN SOLARIS: bi-processors Servers V240 SparcIIIi, with Solaris 8 OS and 8 GB of RAM.
• Class Type LINUX 32 bit: bi-processors Servers Intel Xeon 32 bit, with Linux Red Hat Enterprise 3.0 Update5 OS and 4 GB of RAM.
• Class Type LINUX 64 bit: bi-processors Servers AMD Opteron 64 bit, with Linux Red Hat Enterprise 3.0 Update5 OS and 16 GB of RAM.
In this section, we compare the performance of a different scheduler to the prisoner agent's scheduler with a variety of input files for "Eldo" circuit simulator [8] .
The Potential Function
In this section the scheduler that relies on the ideas from game theory and multi-agent systems is presented. The core of the algorithm that is used is also given. There are 100 jobs each represented by an agent and there are 10 compute server.
This is the applied scheduling algorithm for experimental tests: 
Experimental Results
The simulation is executed with different input files and the monitoring of these jobs best demonstrates the strength of Prisoner Agent's scheduler only when the average Grid Cluster initial load is greater than 35%. Therefore, the initial load condition on a Cluster Grid is a very important parameter in order to measure scheduler jobs throughput. 
Conclusions
Experiment tests have demonstrated that the best total throughput is obtained using Potential Games scheduler, but only if the mean jobs completion time is longer than 3 hours and less than 18 hours (pertaining to jobs classes eldo2, eldo3, eldo4) and moreover Grid Cluster average load must be greater than 35%. Else the MinMin or Load Balancing schedulers have the best jobs throughput.
So we have demonstrated that on a Grid Cluster applying Potential Games as a scheduling algorithm, the average waiting time on a queue decreases and jobs throughput increases when system resources usage also increases.
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